Routing protocols have been extended over time to use cryptographic mechanisms to ensure that data received from a neighboring router has not been modified in transit and actually originated from an authorized neighboring router.
Problem Statement
Protocols, such as OSPF version 2 [RFC2328] , version 3 [RFC5340] , IS-IS [RFC1195] , BGP-4 [RFC4271] , and BFD [RFC5880] , employ various mechanisms to create a cryptographic digest of each transmitted protocol packet. Traditionally, these digests are the results of a one-way hash algorithm, such as Message Digest 5 (MD5) [RFC1321] , across the contents of the packet being transmitted. A secret key is used as the hash base (or seed). The digest is then recomputed by the receiving router, using the same key as the original router used to create the hash, then compared with the transmitted digest to verify:
o That the router originating this packet is authorized via the shared key mechanism to peer with the local router and exchange routing data. The implicit trust of the routing protocol exchange protected by a shared secret is intended to protect against the injection of falsely generated routing data into the routing system by unauthorized systems.
o That the data has not been altered in transit between the two neighboring routers.
Digest verification schemes are not intended to protect the confidentiality of information being exchanged between routers. The information (entries in the routing table) is potentially available through other mechanisms. Moreover, access to the physical media between two routers exchanging routing data will confer the ability to capture or otherwise discover the contents of the routing tables in those routers.
Authentication mechanisms defined today have notable limitations:
o Manual configuration of shared secret keys, especially in large networks and between networks, poses a major management problem. In many cases, it is challenging to replace keys without significant coordination or disruption.
o In some cases, when manual keys are configured, some forms of replay protection are no longer possible, allowing the routing protocol to be attacked through the replay of captured routing messages.
This document outlines some of the problems with manual keying of these cryptographic algorithms.
Pre-Image vs. Collision Attacks
A pre-image attack (an attempt to find new data with the same hash value) would enable someone to find an input message that causes a hash function to produce a particular output. In contrast, a collision attack finds two messages with the same hash, but the attacker can't pick what the message will be. Feasible collision attacks against MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128, and RIPEMD have been documented in [Crypto2004] .
The ability to produce a collision does not currently introduce any obvious or known attacks on routing protocols. Pre-image attacks have the potential to cause problems in the future; however, due to the message length, there are serious limitations to the feasibility of mounting such an attack.
Protocols themselves have some built-in protection against collision attacks. This is because a lot of values for fields in a protocol packet are invalid or will produce an unusable packet. For example, in OSPF the Link State Advertisement (LSA) type can be from 1 to 11. Any other value in the field will result in the packet being discarded.
Assume two packets M and M' are generated and have the same hash.
The above condition will further reduce the ability to produce a message that is also a correct message from the protocol perspective, as a lot of potential values are themselves not valid. 
Management Issues with OSPFv2
According to the OSPF specification [RFC2328] , digests are applied to packets transmitted between adjacent neighbors, rather than being applied to the routing information originated by a router (digests are not applied at the LSA level, but rather at the packet level). [RFC2328] states that any set of OSPF routers adjacent across a single link may use a different key to build MD5 digests than the key used to build MD5 digests on any other link. Thus, MD5 keys may be configured, and changed, on a per-link basis in an OSPF network.
OSPF does not specify a mechanism to negotiate keys, nor does it specify any mechanism to negotiate the hash algorithms to be used.
With the proliferation of the number of hash algorithms, as well as the need to continuously upgrade the algorithms, manually configuring the information becomes very tedious. It should also be noted that rekeying OSPF requires coordination among the adjacent routers.
Technical Issues with OSPFv2
While OSPF provides relatively strong protection through the inclusion of MD5 digests, with additional data and sequence numbers in transmitted packets, there are still attacks against OSPF:
o The sequence number is initialized to zero when forming an adjacency with a newly discovered neighbor. When an adjacency is brought down, the sequence number is also set to zero. Recently, limitations in collision-resistance properties of the MD5 and SHA-1 hash functions have been discovered; [RFC4270] summarizes the discoveries. There have been attacks against the use of MD5 as a hash; while these attacks do not directly apply to the use of MD5 in routing protocols, it is prudent to have other options available. For this reason, the general use of these algorithms should be discouraged, and [RFC5709] adds support for using SHA-1 and SHA-2 with the HMAC construct for OSPF.
o OSPF on a broadcast network shares the same key between all neighbors on that broadcast network. Some OSPF packets are sent to a multicast address.
Spoofing by any malicious neighbor possessing credentials or replayable packets is therefore very easy. Possession of the key itself is used as an identity validation, and no other identity check is used. A malicious neighbor could send a packet, forging the identity of the sender as being from another neighbor. There would be no way in which the victim could distinguish the identity of the packet sender.
o In some OSPF implementations, neighbors on broadcast, nonbroadcast multi-access (NBMA), and point-to-multipoint networks are identified by the IP address in the IP header. The IP header is not covered by the MAC in the cryptographic authentication scheme as described in RFC 2328, and an attack can be made to exploit this omission.
Assume the following scenario.
R1 sends an authenticated HELLO to R2. This HELLO is captured and replayed back to R1. The source IP in the IP header of the replayed packet is changed to that of R2.
R1, not finding itself in the HELLO, would deduce that the connection is not bidirectional and would bring down the adjacency.
Open Shortest Path First Version 3 (OSPFv3)
OSPFv3 [RFC5340] relies on the IP Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] and the IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] to cryptographically sign routing information passed between routers.
When using ESP, the null encryption algorithm [RFC2410] is used, so the data carried in the OSPFv3 packets is signed, but not encrypted. This provides data origin authentication for adjacent routers, and data integrity (which gives the assurance that the data transmitted by a router has not changed in transit). However, it does not provide confidentiality of the information transmitted; this is acceptable because the privacy of the information being carried in the routing protocols need not be kept secret.
"Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3" [RFC4552] mandates the use of ESP with null encryption for authentication and also does encourage the use of confidentiality to protect the privacy of the routing information transmitted, using ESP encryption. However, it only specifies the use of manual keying of routing information as discussed in the following section.
Management Issues with OSPFv3
The OSPFv3 security document ("Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3" [RFC4552] ) discusses, at length, the reasoning behind using manually configured keys, rather than some automated key management protocol such as IKEv2 [RFC4306] . The primary problem is the lack of a suitable key management mechanism, as OSPF adjacencies are formed on a one-to-many basis and most key management mechanisms are designed for a one-to-one communication model. This forces the system administrator to use manually configured security associations (SAs) and cryptographic keys to provide the authentication and, if desired, confidentiality services.
Regarding replay protection, [RFC4552] states that:
Since it is not possible using the current standards to provide complete replay protection while using manual keying, the proposed solution will not provide protection against replay attacks.
In the OSPFv3 case, the primary administrative issue with manually configured SAs and keys is the management issue --maintaining shared sets of keys on all routers within a network. As with OSPFv2, rekeying is an infrequent event requiring coordination. [RFC4552] does not require that all OSPFv3 routers have the same key configured for every neighbor, so each set of neighbors connected to a given link could have a different key configured. While this makes it easier to change the keys (by forcing the system administrator to only change the keys on the routers on a single link), the process of manual configuration for all the routers in a network to change the keys used for OSPFv3 digests and confidentiality on a periodic basis can be difficult.
Technical Issues with OSPFv3
The primary technical concern with the current specifications for OSPFv3 is that when manual SA and key management is used as specified in "Sequence Number Generation", Section 3. o Capturing a full adjacency process (from two-way all the way to FULL state), and then replaying this process when the router is no longer attached can cause a false adjacency to be formed, allowing an attacker to attract traffic.
o OSPFv3 on a broadcast network shares the same key between all neighbors on that network. Some OSPF packets are sent to a multicast address.
Spoofing by a malicious neighbor is very easy. Possession of the key itself is used as an identity check. There is no other identity check used. A neighbor could send a packet specifying the packet came from some other neighbor and there would be no way in which the attacked router could figure out the identity of the packet sender.
Intermediate System to Intermediate System Routing Protocol (IS-IS)
Integrated IS-IS [RFC1195] uses HMAC-MD5 authentication with manual keying, as described in [RFC5304] , and has recently been extended to provide support for using the HMAC construct along with the SHA family of cryptographic hash functions [RFC5310] . There is no provision within IS-IS to encrypt the body of a routing protocol message. The few cases where existing mechanisms in the IS-IS protocol would not effectively reject old information are: -the Hello packets or the IS-IS Hellos (IIHs) that are used to discover neighbors, and -the Sequence Number Packets (SNPs).
As described in IS-IS [RFC1195] , a list of known neighbors is included in each Hello transmitted by an intermediate system to ensure two-way communications with any specific neighbor before exchanging link state databases.
IS-IS does not provide a sequence number. IS-IS packets are vulnerable to replay attacks; any packet can be replayed at any point of time. So long as the keys used are the same, protocol elements that would not be rejected will affect existing sessions.
A Hello packet containing a digest within a TLV and an empty neighbor list could be replayed, resulting in all adjacencies with the original transmitting intermediate system to be restarted.
A replay of an old Complete Sequence Number Packet (CSNP) could cause LSPs to be flooded, resulting in an LSP storm.
IS-IS specifies the use of the HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1 to protect IS-IS packets.
IS-IS does not have a notion of Key ID. During key rollover, each message received has to be checked for integrity against all keys that are valid. A denial-of-service (DoS) attack may be induced by sending IS-IS packets with random hashes. This will cause the IS-IS packet to be checked for authentication with all possible keys, increasing the amount of processing required. This issue, however, has been fixed in the recent [RFC5310] , which introduces the concept of Key IDs in IS-IS.
Recently, limitations in collision-resistance properties of the MD5 and SHA-1 hash functions have been discovered; [RFC4270] summarizes the discoveries. There have been attacks against the use of MD5 as a hash; while these attacks do not directly apply to the use of HMAC-MD5 in IS-IS, it is prudent to have other options available. For this reason, the general use of these algorithms should be discouraged, and [RFC5310] adds support for using HMAC-SHA with IS-IS.
IS-IS on a broadcast network shares the same key between all neighbors on that network.
This makes spoofing by a malicious neighbor easy since IS-IS packets are sent to a link-layer multicast address. Possession of the key itself is used as an authorization check. A neighbor could send a packet spoofing the identity of a neighbor, and there would be no way in which the attacked router could discern the identity of the malicious packet sender.
The Remaining Lifetime field in the LSP is not covered by the authentication. An IS-IS router can receive its own self-generated LSP segment with zero lifetime remaining. In that case, if it has a copy with non-zero lifetime, it purges that LSP, i.e., it increments the current sequence number and floods all the segments again. This is much worse in IS-IS than in OSPF because there is only one LSP other than the pseudonode LSPs for the LANs on which the IS-IS router is the Designated Intermediate System (DIS).
In this way, an attacker can force the router to flood all segments --potentially a large number if the number of routes is large. It also causes the sequence number of all the LSPs to increase fast. If the sequence number increases to the maximum (0xFFFFFFFF), the IS-IS process must shut down for around 20 minutes (the product of MaxAge + ZeroAgeLifetime) to allow the old LSPs to age out of all the router databases. [RFC0793] for transporting routing information between BGP speakers that have formed an adjacency.
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4) BGP-4 [RFC4271] uses TCP
[RFC2385] describes the use of the TCP MD5 digest option for providing packet origin authentication and data integrity protection of BGP packets. [RFC3562] provides suggestions for choosing the key length of the ad hoc Keyed MD5 mechanism specified in [RFC2385] . There is no provision for confidentiality for any of these BGP messages.
TCP MD5 [RFC2385] has recently been obsoleted by a new TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) [RFC5925] . [RFC5925] specifies the use of stronger Message Authentication Codes (MACs), protects against replays even for long-lived TCP connections, and provides more details than TCP-MD5 on the association of security with TCP connections. It allows rekeying during a TCP connection, assuming that an out-of-band protocol or manual mechanism provides the new keys. Note that TCP MD5 does not preclude rekeying during a connection, but does not require its support either. Further, TCP-AO supports key changes with zero segment loss, whereas key changes in TCP MD5 can lose segments in transit during the changeover or require trying multiple keys on each received segment during key use overlap because TCP MD5 lacks an explicit Key ID. Although TCP recovers lost segments through retransmission, loss can have a substantial impact on performance.
However, this document covers only TCP MD5, as all current deployments are still using BGP with TCP MD5 and have not upgraded to [RFC5925] . There isn't enough operational experience present to evaluate the technical and management issues with this proposal yet.
Compared to previously described IGP protocols, BGP has additional exposure due to the nature of the environment where it is typically used --namely, between autonomous networks (under different administrative control). While routers running interior gateway protocols may all be configured with the same administrative authority, two BGP peers may be in different administrative domains, having different policies for key strength, rollover frequency, etc. An autonomous system must often support a large number of keys at different BGP boundaries, as each connecting AS represents a different administrative entity. In practice, once set, shared secrets between BGP peers are rarely, if ever, changed.
Management Issues with BGP-4
Each pair of BGP speakers forming a peering may have a different MD5 shared key that facilitates the independent configuration and changing of keys across a large-scale network. Manual configuration and maintenance of cryptographic keys across all BGP sessions is a challenge in any large-scale environment.
Most BGP implementations will accept BGP packets with a bad digest up to the hold interval negotiated between BGP peers at peering startup, in order to allow for MD5 keys to be changed with minimal impact on operation of the network. This technique does, however, allow some short period of time during which an attacker may inject BGP packets with false MD5 digests into the network and can expect those packets to be accepted, even though the MD5 digests are not valid.
Technical Issues with BGP-4
BGP relies on TCP [RFC0793] for transporting data between BGP speakers. BGP can rely on TCP's protection against data corruption and replay to preclude replay attacks against BGP sessions. A great deal of research has gone into the feasibility of an attacker overcoming these protections, including [TcpWindow] and [Conv01] . Most router and operating system (OS) vendors have modified their TCP implementations to resolve the security vulnerabilities described in these references, where possible.
As mentioned earlier, MD5 is vulnerable to collision attacks and can be attacked through several means, such as those explored in [Wang04] .
Though it can be argued that the collision attacks do not have a practical application in this scenario, the use of MD5 should be discouraged.
Routers performing cryptographic processing of packets in software may be exposed to additional opportunities for DoS attacks. An attacker may be able to transmit enough spoofed traffic with false digests that the router's processor and memory resources are consumed, causing the router to be unable to perform normal processing. This exposure is particularly problematic between routers not under unified administrative control.
The Routing Information Protocol (RIP)
The initial version of RIP was specified in STD 34 [RFC1058] . This version did not provide for any authentication or authorization of routing data, and thus was vulnerable to any of a number of attacks against routing protocols. This limitation was one reason why this protocol was moved to Historic status [RFC1923] .
RIPv2, originally specified in [RFC1388] , then [RFC1723] , was finalized in STD 56 [RFC2453] . This version of the protocol provides for authenticating packets with a digest. The details thereof have initially been provided in "RIP-2 MD5 Authentication" [RFC2082] ; "RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication" [RFC4822] obsoletes [RFC2082] and adds details of how the SHA family of hash algorithms can be used to protect RIPv2. [RFC2082] only specified the use of Keyed MD5.
Technical Issues with RIP
o The sequence number used by a router is initialized to zero at startup, and is also set to zero whenever the neighbor is brought down. If the cryptographically protected packets of a router that is brought down (for administrative or other reasons) are stored by a malicious router, the new router could replay the packets from the previous session, thus forcing traffic through the malicious router. Dropping of such packets by the router could result in blackholes. Also, forwarding wrong packets could result in routing loops.
o RIPv2 allows multiple packets with the same sequence number. This could mean the same packet may be replayed many times before the next legitimate packet is sent. An attacker may resend the same packet repeatedly until the next Hello packet is transmitted and received, which means the Hello interval therefore determines the attack window.
o RIPv2 [RFC2453] did not specify the use of any particular hash algorithm. RFC 4822 introduced HMAC-SHA1 as mandatory to implement, along with Keyed MD5 as specified in [RFC2082] . Support for Keyed MD5 was mandated to ensure compatability with legacy implementations.
o "RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication" [RFC4822] does not cover the UDP and the IP headers. It is therefore possible for an attacker to modify some fields in the above headers without routers becoming aware of it.
There is limited exposure to modification of the UDP header, as the RIP protocol uses only it to compute the length of the RIP packet. Changes introduced in the UDP header would cause RIP authentication to fail the RIP authentication, thereby limiting exposure.
RIP uses the source IP address from the IP header to determine which RIP neighbor it has learnt the RIP Update from. Changing the source IP address can be used by an attacker to disrupt the RIP routing sessions between two routers R1 and R2, as shown in the following examples.
Scenario 1:
R1 sends an authenticated RIP message to R2 with a cryptographic sequence number X.
The attacker then needs a packet with a higher sequence number originated by R2 either, from this session or from some earlier session.
The attacker can then replay this packet to R2 by changing the source IP to that of R1.
R2 would then no longer accept any more RIP Updates from R1, as those would have a lower cryptographic sequence number. After 180 seconds (or less), R2 would consider R1 timed out and bring down the RIP session.
Scenario 2:
R1 announces a route with cost C1 to R2. This packet can be captured by an attacker. Later, if this cost changes and R1 announces this with a different cost C2, the attacker can replay the captured packet, modifying the source IP to a new arbitrary IP address, thereby masquerading as a different router.
R2 will accept this route and the router as a new gateway, and R2 would then use the non-existent router as a next hop for that network. This would only be effective if the cost C1 is less than C2.
Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
BFD is specified in [RFC5880] . Extensions to BFD for multihop [RFC5883] and single hop [RFC5881] are defined for IPv4 and IPv6. It is designed to detect failure with the forwarding plane next hop.
The BFD base specification specifies an optional authentication mechanism that can be used by the receiver of a packet to be able to authenticate the source of the packet. It relies on the facts that the keys are shared between the peers and no mechanism is defined for the actual key generation.
Technical Issues with BFD
o The level of security provided is based on the Authentication Type used. However, the authentication algorithms defined are MD5 or SHA-1 based. As mentioned earlier, MD5 and SHA-1 are both known to be vulnerable to collision attacks.
o The BFD specification mentions mechanisms to allow for the change of authentication state based on the state of a received packet. This can cause a denial-of-service attack where a malicious authenticated packet (stored from a past session) can be relayed over a session that does not use authentication. This causes one end to assume that authentication is enabled at the other end, and hence the BFD adjacency is dropped. This would be a harder attack to put forth when meticulously keyed authentication is in use.
o BFD works on microsecond timers. When malicious packets are sent at short intervals, with the authentication bit set, it can cause a DoS attack.
o BFD allows a mode called the echo mode. Echo packets are not defined in the BFD specification, though they can keep the BFD session up. There are no guidelines on the properties of the echo packets beyond the choice of the source and destination addresses. While the BFD specification recommends applying security mechanisms to prevent spoofing of these packets, there are no guidelines on what type of mechanisms are appropriate.
Any security issues in the echo mode will directly affect the BFD protocol and session states, and hence the network stability. The potential effects and remedies as understood today are somewhat limited, however. For instance, any replay attacks would be indistinguishable from normal forwarding of the tested router. An attack would still cause a faulty link to be believed to be up, but there is little that can be done about it. However, if the echo packets are guessable, it may be possible to spoof from an external source and cause BFD to believe that a one-way link is really bidirectional. As a result, it is important that the echo packets contain random material that is also checked upon reception.
o BFD packets can be sent at millisecond intervals (the protocol uses timers at microsecond intervals). When using authentication, this can cause frequent sequence number wrap-around as a 32-bit sequence number is used, thus considerably reducing the security of the authentication algorithms.
o Recently, limitations in collision-resistance properties of the MD5 and SHA-1 hash functions have been discovered; [RFC4270] summarizes the discoveries. There have been attacks against the use of MD5 as a hash; while these attacks do not directly apply to the use of HMAC-MD5 and keyed SHA-1 in BFD, it is prudent to have other options available. Such attacks do not mean that BFD using SHA-1 for authentication is at risk. However, it does mean that SHA-1 should be replaced as soon as possible and should not be used for new applications.
It should be noted that if SHA-1 is used in the Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [RFC2104] construction, then collision attacks currently known against SHA-1 do not apply. The new attacks on SHA-1 have no impact on the security of HMAC-SHA-1.
There are already proposals [GenBFDAuth] that add support for HMAC with the SHA-1 and SHA-2 family of hash functions for BFD.
Security Considerations
This document outlines security issues arising from the current methodology for manual keying of various routing protocols. No specific changes to routing protocols are proposed in this document; likewise, no new security requirements result.
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